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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CENTURIAN CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
A. L. CRIPPS and WALTER
CRIPPS,
SUPREME COURT No. 16971

Defendant and Respondents.
PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC.,
Plaintiff In Intervention,
Respondent,
vs.
CENTURIAN CORPORATION,
RICHARD NICKLES and
MARGARET K. NICKLES,
Defendants in Intervention,
Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT
PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC.
NATURE OF CASE
Centurian Corporation
against A.
amounts

("Centurian")

L. Cripps and Walter A.

due

under

an

agreement

Cripps

wherein

brought an action

("Cripps"),
Centurian

had given possession of a tank trailer to Cripps.
Lease,

Inc.

moved

to

intervene

in the action,

claiming

Corporation
Petty Motor

claiming an in-

terest in the tank trailer, having entered into agreements with
Centur ian

and

Richard

Nickles and Margaret K.

Nickles

("Nick-
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les")

entitled Lease and Agreement of Sale and Purchase.

motion to intervene was granted.
The

trial

entered a

court,

in

judgment

a

Trial was held July 13, 1976.

memorandum decision and

in favor

The

the

judgment,

of Centurian Corporation against

Cripps and held that it was without jurisdiction of the complaint of Petty Motor Lease against the Defendants in Intervention,

Centur ian Corporation,

Richard

Nickles

and

Margaret K.

Nickles.
In

Centurian

Petty Motor Lease,

Corporation

v.

A.

L.

Cripps,

et

al.,

Inc. v. Centurian Corporation, et al., 577

P.2d 955 (Utah 1978), this Court reversed the order of the District

Court

Motor Lease,

denying

jurisdiction

of

the

complaint

of

Petty

Inc. against the Defendants in Intervention, Cen-

turian and Nickles.

This Court held and stated as follows:

We hold that the matter of intervention was properly before the Court and that it was error for the
Court to rule as it did.
This matter is reversed and remanded to the District Court for Salt Lake County with instructions to
enter judgment in accordance with the evidence presented at trial in the actions relating to both
files.
We leave it to the discretion of the Court as
to whether it should open the case and take further
evidence in this matter.
On remand, judgment was entered April 9, 1979 in favor
of Petty Motor Lease,

Inc. against Centurian and Nickles.

The

previous judgment in favor of Centurian against Cripps was affirmed.

Petty Motor Lease,

Inc., Centurian and Nickles sought

additional relief of the District Court by way of motions to
amend, but such motions were denied.

( 2)
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent
Inc.,

and

Cross-Appellant,

Petty

Motor

Lease,

prays that the judgment of the Di3trict Court be affirmed

as to the liability of Centurian and the Nickles, but that the
amount of such liability be corrected,
est applicable to

that the rate of inter-

the amounts due Petty Motor

Lease,

Inc.

be

corrected, and for an award of attorneys fees subsequent to the
first trial of this matter,
curred after

including fees on appeal,

fees in-

the remand of the case to the District Court, and

attorney's fees in the present appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In February 1973, Petty Motor Lease,

Inc. entered into

agreements with Centur ian and Nickles regarding a 1973 Transliner semi-tank
(Exhibit
8-I) .

7-I)

trailer.

and

an Agreement of Sale and Purchase

Several of

but because of
not quoted here.

The agreements consisted of a

the

the

provisions of

length of

and

Lease,

Lease

are

(Exhibit

pertinent,

those provisions are

The Lease was executed by Centurian Corpora-

tion and Petty Motor Lease,
Nickles

the

the

Lease

Margaret

K.

Inc. and was guaranteed by Richard

Nickles.

The

Agreement

of

Sale

and

Purchase provides as follows:
This agreement made and entered into between
Petty Motor Lease, Inc., hereinafter called "Owner";
and Centur ian Corpora ti on, hereinafter called "User";
to-wit:
1.
User has leased from Owner a 1973 Trans-liner
semi-tank trailer, serial number 151472, and desires
to purchase said unit at the termination of lease,
after all payments called for by the lease have been
paid, and the Owner desires to sell unit to User at
that time.
( 3)
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2. , It is agreed that the User will pay to the
Owner the sum of Six Hundred Twenty One and 00/100
Dollars, plus applicable sales tax and interest at six
percent per annum ( 6%) , plus any deposits or advance
paym~nts made and Owner
shall keep all payments made
or monies paid or deposited under the terms of the
lease referred to above.

3.
The

Agreement

Corporation

of

and

This agreement is binding upon both parties.
Sale and Purchase was
Petty

Motor

Lease,

executed

Inc.

and

by Centur ian
guaranteed

by

Richard Nickles.
Centur ian received and

took possession of the trailer

on or about February 1, 1973 (Finding 5, R. 196).
At

the

trial

of

the

claim

of

Centurian

Corporation

against Cripps, Richard Nickles, President of Centurian, testitied as follows:
Q.

(By Mr. Brown) Mr. Nickles are
tank trailer similar to this one?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you purchase this particular tank trailer new?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

What was the purchase price new?

A.

Approx}mately $18,000.

Q.

• When did you purchase the unit?
asked that.

A.

Gosh, its been so many years I forgot.

Q.

Is it 1973?

A.

January.

Q.

Would you have purchased
prior to that time?

that

you

unit

familiar

I

say

with a

should have

thirty

( 4)
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days

A.

No, I purchased it on the first of February.
This is
wher:t we negotiated the agreement when we bought the
equipment.
(Tr. 12, 13; R. 244, 245)
In May, 1973, Centurian entered into an agreement with

Cripps
ment
as

regarding

the trailer

(Exhibit 1-P)

"Purchaser".

Lease

and

a

{Finding 6,

196).

R.

The Agree-

refers to Centurian as "Seller" and Cripps

Attached to

duplicate

the Agreement are a copy of the

original of

the Agreement

of

Sale and

Purchase between Petty Motor Lease and Centurian.
Shortly thereafter, Cripps leased the trailer to P.I.E.
(Finding

7,

R.

196).

In

December,

P.I.E. to ground the trailer.
Centurian Corporation,
conduct of Centurian,
were

effectively

Centurian

notified

P.I.E., acting on the request of

grounded

of

the

Cripps lost their lease with P.I.E.

and

prevented

earnings from which

1973,

the

from

trailer.

using

the

to pay Centurian.

Because

trailer

Cripps were

to

obtain

unable

to

lease or register the trailer for the year 1974 (Finding 11, R.
196-97).
Centurian
Lease

pursuant

Corporation

to

the

made

Lease

for

payments
the

to

first

Petty

twelve

Motor

payments

thereof due through February, 1974.

Centurian made no payments

required by the Lease after March,

1974

On or about March 15, 1974,
29,

1974,

(Finding 8,

the trailer was stolen.

Walter Cripps reported the theft

10, R. 196).

(Ex.

4-P)

R.

196).

On March
(Finding

Exhibit 3-P indicates that on April 4, 1974, the

location

of

the

Police.

Exhibit

trailer
3

was

was

known

mailed

by

April

the
8,

New

1974

Mexico
and

State

postmarked

April 9, 1974.
(5)
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The pertinent conclusions of law of the District Court
are as follows:
1.
The Lease and Agreement of Sale and Purchase,
construed together, constitute an agreement of sale and
purchase, and include all of the terms of the Lease insofar
as consistent with ·the Agreement of Sale and Purchase.
Centurian Corporation was obligated to perform the provisions of the Lease and thereupon purchase the trailer.
Centurian Corporation breached its obligations thereunder.
2.
Centurian Corporation received possession of the
trailer and accepted delivery thereof.
Upon said receipt,
the risk of loss, as between Petty Motor Lease, Inc. and
Centurian Corporation, passed to Centurian Corporation.
3.
Petty Motor Lease, Inc. is entitled to the amount
which it would have received had the Lease and Agreement of
Sale and Purchase been per formed, namely, (a) the remaining
twenty lease payments at $580, or $11, 600, together with
sales tax and interest at the rate of six percent per annum
from the date of theft of the trailer in the amount of
$3,512 to the date of judgment, and (b) $621, together with
sales tax and interest at the rate of six percent per annum
from February 6, 1973, in the amount of $229 to the date of
judgment, and (c) less the amount deposited by Centurian
Corporation with Petty Motor Lease, Inc., $3,594.63. Petty
Motor Lease, Inc. is entitled to the sum of $12,367.37,
together with sales tax at the applicable rate at the time
of payment.

5.
Petty Motor Lease, Inc. is entitled to its reasonable attorney's fees.
A reasonable sum to be awarded
Petty Motor Lease, Inc. for the use and benefit of its
attorney is the sum of $540.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE LEASE (EXHIBIT 7-I) AND THE AGREEMENT OF SALE
AND PURCHASE (EXHIBIT 8-I) CONSTITUTE A CONTRACT OF SALE.
The Agreement of Sale and Purchase specifically refers
to the Lease and clearly expresses the parties' intentions.

It

provides that Centurian desires to purchase the trailer at the
termination of the Lease and that Petty Motor Lease desires to
sell the trailer.

The Agreement further provides Centurian
( 6)
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~il!

pay

a

specified

which

both

Agreement

amount

parties
of

Sale

to

complete

expressed
and

their

the

purchase

intention.

Purchase,·- viewed

and

The

together,

sale

to

Lease

and

clearly

re-

quire Centurian to make the payments and perform the other obligations

required by

the Lease,

and

thereupon pay $621,

with

six percent interest thereon, to buy the trailer.
The construction of a contract requires the ascertainment of the intent and purpose of the contract.
of

the

parties

are

controlling

and

normally

are determined from the written contract.
in Mark

Steel Corporation v.

The intentions
those

intentions

This rule is stated

Eimco Corporation,

548

P.2d

892

(Utah 1976):
The primary rule in interpreting a contract is to
determine what the parties intended by what they
said.
We do not add, ignore or discard words in this
process; but attempt to render certain the meaning of
the provision in dispute by an objective and reasonable construction of the whole contract.
(Footnote
omitted. )
The agreements are clear and

free of ambiguity.

The District

Court's construction of the documents was objective and reasonable.

The decision of the District Court is entitled to a pre-

sumption of validity.
dence
most
543

and

any

favorable
P. 2d

1349

agreements

This Court is required to view the evi-

inferences
to

to

sustaining

(Utah

1975).

be

drawn

the
If

therefrom

(Petty Motor Lease submits

Cutler

the

light

v.

Bowen,

is any ambiguity

in the

decision.

there

in

there is not),

the Dis-

trict court may resort to parol evidence to determine the parties'
Inc.

intentions and eliminate the ambiguity.
v.

Holm,

570

P. 2d

690

(Utah 1977);

Big Butte Ranch,

Mathis

v.

Madsen,

( 7)
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1

U. 2d

46,

261

P. 2d

952

Richard Nickles'

(1953}.

testimony at

trial clearly indicates that the agreements constituted a purchase:
Q.

Did you £Urchase this particular tank trailer new?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

What was the purchase price new?

A.

Approximately $18,000.

Q.

Would you have purchased
days prior to that time?

A.

No, I ~chased it on the first day of February. This
is when we negotiated the agreement when we bought the
equipment.
(Emphasis added; Tr. 12, 13, R. 244, 245.}

that

unit

say

thirty

(30}

This clearly establishes that Centurian and Nickles understood
the arrangement to be a purchase.
Appellants,
authority,

without

any

explanation

or

reference

to

imply that the Lease and Agreement of Sale and Pur-

chase cons ti tu te an option or a conditional sale.
ments do not support this theory.

The agree-

The intentions of the par-

ties, Centurian to purchase and Petty Motor Lease to sell, are
clear.

There is no language of option or condition.

ian's obligation is unconditional.

Centur-

The District COUft correct-

ly construed the agreements as an agreement of sale and purchase.

This construction must be affirmed.

POINT II.
THE RISK OF LOSS OF THE TRAILER, BY FIRE, THEFT
OR OTHERWISE, PASSED TO CENTURIAN CORPORATION UPON ITS
RECEIPT OF THE TRAILER.
Centurian Corporation
on or about February 1, 1973.

received

the

semi-tank

trailer

When Petty Motor Lease delivered

possession of the trailer to Centurian Corporation and Centur(8}
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ian

Corpora ti on

received

loss passed to Centurian.

and

accepted

delivery,

the

risk

of

Chapter 2 of the Uniform Commercial

Code, at Section 70A-2-509(3), provides as follows:
In any case not within Section (1) [where the
contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the
goods by carrier] or ( 2) [where the goods are held by
a bailee to be delivered without being moved], the
risk of loss passes to the buyer on his receipt of the
goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise, the risk
passes to the buyer on tender of delivery.
Since

the buyer,

Centur ian Coq>oration,

it is irrelevant whether the seller,

received the trailer,

Petty Motor Lease,

Inc. ,

Bronx-Westchester

White

is a merchant or not.
In

White

Trucks, Inc., 18
the Court,

Motor

u.c.c.

Corp.

v.

Reporting Service 382 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1975),

in a case similar to the matter before this Court,

stated:
Plaintiff, a manufacturer of trucks, delivered to
defendant an Autocar truck, pursuant to order by defendant.
Plaintiff received a receipt from the manager of defendant's garage for delivery of the truck.
It also invoiced the defendant for the agreed price of
the truck. After the truck was delivered and invoiced
to defendant and while it was in possession of defendant, it was stolen from defendant's garage.
As appears from the answer and from the papers
submitted by defendant, defendant's position is that
title to the truck was never in its name.
This contention is based on the agreement between the parties
which it is asserted by defendant reserved to plaintiff a security title pending payment, or in part that
title papers were not delivered to defendant until
after the theft of the truck.
The title papers in
question were the manufacturer's statement of origin
and assignment of title.
The questions presented in this case are (1) whether title to the truck at the time of the theft was
material, and (2) assuming that the location of title
as between the parties was material, whether title
had, or had not, passed to defendant.
( 9)
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Under the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-509, passage of title is immaterial and the risk of loss is
upon defendant irrespective of title.
Under subdivision ( 3) the risk of loss passed to the defendant on
receipt and possession of the truck.
(Emphasis added.)
In

Nordstrom,

Law

of

Sales,

referring

to

Section

2-509, the author states:
After the contract and after conforming goods have
been placed in the possess ion of the buyer, the buyer
bears the risk.
(Page 394.)
Similarly, at Page 405:
The merchant rule (2-509(3)] conforms to the general code policy of placing the risk on the party who
has control of the goods at the time of their loss.
Risk does not pass until the buyer has received the
goods; however, the non-merchant seller can shift the
risk even though he retains control of the goods risk
passes when the non-merchant seller
tenders
delivery.
(Emphasis in original.)
The policy behind this rule is to place the risk upon
the

party

which

sound policy.

controls

possession

of

the

goods.

That

is

Petty Motor Lease had no control over the trail-

er, having delivered possession to Centurian.
Cen tur ian

is

obligated

to

per form

the

terms

of

the

agreements, to pay the amounts required to purchase the trailer.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DEDUCTING THE AMOUNT
OF THE DEPOSIT FROM THE AMOUNTS DUE PETTY MOTOR LEASE.
The District Court was correct in construing the Lease
and Agreement of Sale and Purchase together and in its determination that together they constitute an agreement of sale.
Point

I,

above.)

Corporation

The

to make

integrated agreement

all

payments called

for

required
by

(See

Centurian

the Lease and

thereupon to:

(10)
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. pay to the owner the sum of Six Hundred TWenty
One and 00/100 Dollars plus applicable sales tax and
interest at six percent per annum (6%), plus any deposits or advance payrne~ts mad~ and owner shall kee~!
~yments made or monies
ea1d or deposited under the
terms of the lease referred to above. (Exhibit 8-I:
emphasis added.)
Petty Motor Lease,
lease payments

Inc.

is entitled to the remaining

(twenty lease payments at $580 equals $11,060),

plus the amount of the sale and purchase of the trailer ($621) ,
plus applicable sales tax and
tered

judgment

The

interest.

consistent with

the

foregoing

trial court enexcept

that

it

provided for deduction of the deposit made by Centurian Corporation in the sum of $3,094.63.

The Agreement of Sale and Pur-

chase specifically provides that the purchase amount of $621 is
in addition to any deposit or advance payments made "and owner
shall

keep

all

payments

made

or

monies

terms of the lease referred to above."

deposited

under

the

From the foregoing pro-

visions of the agreement of sale and purchase, it is clear that
the trial court erred in deducting

the amount of the deposit

which had been made under the lease.
POINT IV.

THE LEASE PLACES THE RISK OF LOSS ON CENTURIAN.

Even if the Lease and Agreement of Sale and Purchase
were construed to be a lease with a condition or option of sale
and purchase, Centurian Corporation is responsible for the safe
keeping and return to Petty Motor Lease of the trailer.
obligation and liability arises because of (1)
ment and

(2)

This

the lease agree-

the failure of Centurian Corporation to rebut the

presumption that the theft was due to its negligence.

(11)
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The Lease between Petty Motor Lease,

Inc. and Centur-

ian Corporation provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
2.
User agrees to deposit with Owner the sum of
$3,594.63 until all terms of this lease have been
faithfully performed and the property returned to
owner in a satisfactory condition, whereupon said deposit will be returned to User. However, if User violates any condition of this agreement, Owner may retain such portion of said deposit as may be necessary
to compensate Owner for the loss or damage caused by
such violation, and should the sum deposited be insufficient to compensate Owner for the loss or damage
caused by such violation, User agrees to pay the
deficiency to Owner.
3.
User agrees to continually
property in good condition and repair .

maintain

said

7. Upon expiration or termination of this agreement, User shall surrender the unit to Owner in good
mechanical condition and repair, with tires having at
least 50 percent of original tread and free from body
damage, scratched or chipped paint, or torn or frayed
upholstery. Any expense by Owner to bring unit to the
above described condition shall be paid for by User.
8.
If User fails to make payments when due, or
if User fails to perform any other condition of this
lease, . . . User agrees to pay all costs and expenses
including reasonable attorney's fees,
incurred by
Owner in enforcement of its rights under this agreement .
Considering

the

Lease only,

the

foregoing

provisions clearly

indicate that the User, Centurian Corporation, was responsible
for the care, maintenance and return of the trailer.
ment,

Centurian Corporation agreed

condition and return of the trailer.

By agree-

to be responsible for

the

As stated at 8 Am.Jur.2d.

Bailment, Section 200: "It is the general rule that unless made
so by statute or

~

exeress contract,

an ordinary bailee, no

matter to what class he belongs, is not an insurer of safety of

( 12)
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goods delivered
omitted.)

into his keeping."

(Ernphas is added,

footnote

Similarly, in Section 201 the rule is stated:
Unless a bailee has violated his contract he will
not be liable in the absence of negligence, for loss
or injury in respect of the thing bailed, resulting
from the inherent nature of the property itself or
some infirmity thereof, from disaster or accidental
casualty, or from robbery, burglary, or theft.
Nor is
he liable for loss of the property because the process
of law directed against his bailer, confiscation or
taking by superior force, the act or negligence of a
third person, or the negligence or contributory negligence of the bailer, his servants, or agents.
Of
course, such duties and the liability or failure to
perform them may also be imposed on the bailee by virtue of special contract. The exercise of the required
degree of care may be found in many instances to anticipate and guard against the occurrence of loss or
injury, theft, fire, and similar contingencies, and he
may be held liable for losses proximately resulting
from a lack of due care in this respect.
(Emphasis
added, footnotes omitted.)
A bailee is held to his agreement, express or implied,

even if the agreement exceeds the responsibility created by law.
As stated at 8 Am.Jur.2d, Bailment, Section 137:
A bailee may enlarge his legal responsibility for
the subject of the bailrnent by contract, express or
implied, even to the extent of making himself absolutely liable as insurer for the loss or destruction
of goods committed to his care; this is true even of
gratuitous bailees. As a general rule, if there is an
express or implied agreement by the bailee which
clearly goes beyond his ordinary obligation as implied
by law, he will be held to this agreement.
In such
cases the bailment contract is controlling and must be
enforced according to its terms, irrespective of the
fact that a less onerous liability is imposed by law
on bailees of the same class generally.
For such an
undertaking, the bailment its elf or the compensation
to be paid for it, is a sufficient consideration.
As stated by this court in Sumsion v. Streator-Smith,
Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680 (1943):

(13)
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It is to be noted that in any event [whether the
bailer pleads trover, in case, or assurnpsit] the bailer must prove a duty and the breach of that duty.
Here, as in the ordinary bailment, that duty rests
entirely on the bailment contract. 132 P.2d at 683.

Today, regardless of the type of action brought,
the entire duty of the bailee with respect to the
bailed chattel is based on the bailment contract. 132
P.2d at 685.
In the §_umsion case, there was no express contract.
tiff,

after damaging his automobile,

engaged the defendant to

take the automobile to the defendant's garage.
garage,

The plain-

En route to the

a loaded coal truck crashed into the rear end of the

plaintiff's

car,

causing

considerable

damage.

Regarding

the

contract, this Court stated:
No express contract was made.
It is therefore a
contract which is implied by law from a conduct of the
parties.
The plaintiff requested that defendant tow
plaintiff's car to the garage.
Defendant agreed to do
so. Nothing was said concerning the obligation of the
defendant to return the car.
We must, therefore,
determine what kind of contract the law will imply
from this conduct. 132 P.2d at 683-684.
In
the

facts

the
are

pr es en t

case,

different.

the same rules apply,

The

duty

of

rests on the agreement of the parties.

Centurian

al though

Corporation

If the agreement of the

parties constitutes a lease or a lease with a conditional or
optional contract of purchase or sale as opposed to an agreement of sale as held by the District Court, the Lease agreement
(Exhibit

7-I)

contains

the

agreement

of

the

parties.

That

agreement is quoted above and provides that Centurian Corporation would return the trailer upon termination or expiration of
the lease.
(14)
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Paragraph

2 of

the

Lease provides

that Centur-ian de-

posit a sum to assure performance of the Lease.
the Lease requires Centurian to maintain the
condition

and

repair.

Paragraph

7

Paragraph 3 of
property in good

requires

Centurian,

upon

expiration or termination of the Lease, to surrender the trailer

in

good

mechanical

condition

and

repair,

with

tires

of

designated tread, and free from body damage, scratched or chipped

paint,

provisions
Corporation
tion,

and

torn

or

conclusively
for

the

in its brief,

frayed

upholstery.

establish

loss

of

the

the

These

liability

trailer.

stated

at

of

Centurian

Centur ian Corpora-

totally ignores the contractual provisions

between the parties which establish its liability.
clearly

contractual

8

Am.Jur.2d,

Bailment,

The rule is

Section

140,

and

therefore quoted at length:
An express agreement by the bailee not merely to
return the subject of the bailment in good condition,
but to repair all damages occasioned by accident or
casualty, or to be "responsible" for, or to repair,
any loss or damage, barring ordinary wear and tear,
creates an unconditional obligation, and for loss or
damage not excepted the bailee is liable irrespective
of his negligence or fault.
The bailee becomes an
insurer also where he enters into a special contract
to return the property in good condition or to pay its
value and is liable for any loss which occurs while it
is in his eossession, even though without his fault.
And where he contracts specially to return the bailed
property in as good condition as when received saving
some other exception or exceptions than ordinary wear
and tear, such exceptions may be regarded as exclusive, and he may be liable as an insurer for loss from
other causes, although without his fault.
The view is generally taken that the fact that
the bailee deposits a sum of money or gives a bond as
secur.i ty for the return of the bailrnent in good condition evidences an intention to extend the common-law
liability of the bailee.
There is, moreover, authority for the view that whenever the bailee is deemed to
( 15)
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have entered into a ~ecial engagement to return the
.e.E.Operty at a certain time in good order, he will not
be released therefrom even where it appears that the
e_roperty was dama~d or destroyed without his fault.
The principle that lies at the foundation of the
authorities on the question imposing liability, irrespective of fault of the bailee where he contracts to
return the property or be responsible for its loss, is
that where a party, by his own contract, creates a
duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make i t
good notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he must have provided against it by
his own contract.
However,
respectable authority
exists for the proposition that bailees, with or without a special contract, are excused when they show
loss or injury by an act of God or of public enemies.
Thieves, tramps and robbers are not deemed to be public enemies in the legal sense of those words, so that
losses occasioned by them do not come within the meaning of such an alleged exception.
(Emphasis added,
footnotes omitted.)
In conclusion,

the Lease clearly places on Centurian the obli-

gation of returning the trailer and, therefore, of assuming the
risk of loss of the trailer.
In addition,

the law creates a presumption regarding

the loss of bailed goods after delivery by the bailer to the
bailee.
to

Once the bailer has shown delivery of the bailed goods

the bailee and a

failure

to

return or

the

return of the

bailed goods in a damaged condition, the bailee has the burden
of proof that it was not negligent in the care of the bailed
goods.
a

This rule is well established and has been followed in

number

of

£ovey_g2rage,

cases

in

this

100 Utah 167,

state,

commencing with

111 P. 2d 545

Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., suera.

(1941),

Romney

v.

followed by

In Sumsion this court

stated:

(16)
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I~ ~omn~~ Covey Garage, ~~· we held that in
an action ex del1cto by the bailer against the bailee,
the ultimate burden of proof at all times remains on
the bailer, but we further held that he could meet
this burden in the ordinary bailment case by showing
the bailment and the failure to return or the return
in a damaged condition.
This showing gave rise to an
inference of negligence which required the bailee to
come forward with an explanation to show that the injury or loss was not due to his negligence.
Unless
bailee conclusively proved due care so that a directed
verdict was required the jury would be allowed to consider both the inference and the evidence so produced
by the bailee. .

Ordinarily, under the rule of the Romney_ case,
the plaintiff can meet this burden by showing,
as the plaintiff did here, the bailment and the return
in a damaged condition.
Upon this showing, the law
arbitrarily raises a presumption of negligence which
makes a prima facie case for the plaintiff sufficient,
unless the bailee .conclusively proves due care, to
carry the case to the jury.
. This presumption is
one of necessity which arises only because of the
peculiar facts ordinarily present in a bailment case.
The cases hold that it would be unreasonable to require the bailer to prove negligence specifically when
the bailee has exclusive possession of the facts and
the means for ascertaining them.
supr~,

The foregoing
v.

rule is also followed

Sterlin_9 Aircraft,

and

Barlow Upholstery

Inc.,
&

17

U.2d

in Clack-Nomah Flying Club
245,

Furniture Co.

v.

408

P.2d

Emmel,

904

(1965)

533 P.2d 900

(Utah 1975).
Petty

Motor

Lease,

Inc.

established

case by establishing delivery of

prima

facie

trailer

to Centur ian and

the failure of Centurian to return the same.

Centurian Corpo-

ration failed

the

its

to meet its burden of proof that it was not ne-

gligent in the loss of the trailer.
Court

held

that

Centurian,

in

Cripps,

interfered with Cripps'

venting

Cripps

from

using

the

Furthermore,

breach

of

agreement

with

relationship with P. I.E.,

pre-

The

Court

trailer.

its

the District

District

( 1 7)
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could have fotind this action negligent on the part of Centur-.
ian,

causing

or

contributing

to

the

theft

of

the

trailer.

Therefore, even if the agreement of the parties is construed to
be solely a lease or a lease with a condition or option, Centurian is nevertheless liable for the loss of the trailer.
If the agreement of Centurian and Petty Motor Lease is
determined to be a lease, Centurian would be obligated to Petty
Motor Lease in an amount in excess of that determined by the
Trial Court or urged by Petty Motor Lease on appeal.

Paragraph

6 of the Lease provides as follows:
This Lease may be terminated by User at any time
during the period of the Lease or, if User violates
any of the terms of this Agreement, Owner may, without
notice, terminate this Lease.
If this Lease is terminated by either Owner or User for any reason or expires as provided in paragraph 1, hereof, User agrees
to pay to Owner any and all past due payments or other
sums then due under the terms of this lease, including, but not limited to, the cost of repairs required
to bring the property to good condition, plus the
final lease payment in full, and, in addition thereof,
to pay 45 percent of the monthly rental multiplied by
the number of months the Lease has yet to run, which
sum is to compensate Owner for the greater costs and
depreciation occurring during the first part of the
Lease as compared to the last part of the Lease.
The amount due Petty Motor Lease under the Lease (if the agreement

between

Petty

Motor

Lease

Agreement of Sale and Purchase)

and

Centur ian and

is as follows:

is

$5, 800,

not

an

repre-

senting 45 percent of the balance due on the Lease as of March
15, 1973, plus the final Lease payment pursuant to paragraph 6
of the Lease (twenty Lease payments at $580.00 equals $11,600 x
45% equals $5, 220,

plus final payment of $580 equals $5, 800);

sales tax on the foregoing amount at the rate of such sales tax
(18)
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applicable

at

the

time

of

receipt

of

the

foregoing

amounts:

interest on $5,800 to the date of judgment; less the deposit in
the amount of $3,594.63;

plus $15,000,

leased vehicle on March 15, 1974.

the total value of the

The sum of the foregoing

is

$17,205.37, exclusive of sales tax and interest.
As to the value of the trailer as of March 15,
Richard

Nickles

testified

$22,000 (Tr. 14).

that

in

March,

1974

the

1974,

value

was

Walter A. Cripps testified that the value of

the trailer in March, 1974 was between $14,500 and $15,000 (Tr.
38).

Neuman C.

Petty,

President of

Petty

Motor

testified that the value of the trailer in March,
tween $15,000 and $16,000 (Tr. 47).
Petty

Motor

Lease

(see Point V),

Inc.,

1974 was be-

See also Tr. 58, 62.

claims

the

amount

Lease and Agreement of Sale and Purchase
terest

Lease,

due

under

the

plus

in-

is $12, 450,

plus sales tax and attorney's fees.

is based on twenty lease payments at $580, or $11,600,

This

the $621

purchase amount, and $229 interest as provided in the Agreement
of

Sale and

Purchase.

rate applied by
Petty

Motor

fees.

This

$11,600,
Court,

is

based

interest

$621

this Court

the District Court

Lease
is

If

of

$15,962,
upon

$3,512

plus $229 as

is correct,

plus

twenty
as

determines

sales

lease

tax

by

interest

the amount due
and

payments

determined

the

at
the

attorney's
$580,

or

District

the purchase amount with interest at

six percent per annum as provided in the Agreement of Sale and
Purchase.

There

should

be

no deduction

for

the deposit

Point III).
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(see

Appellants rely on paragraph 5 of the Lease in an attempt to absolve them from liability.

Paragraph 5 provides:

5.
User agrees to maintain during the term of
this lease not less than $25, 000 property damage insurance and $100, 000/$300, 000 public liability insurance, which insurance shall provide protection for
Owner and user.
The (
) agrees to maintain during the term of this lease, fire, theft, comprehensive and $100 deductible collision insurance on
the above described property, which insurance shall
provide protection for Owner and User as their interest may appear.
In case of damage User agrees to pay
the first $100 of the cost of replacement or repairs
and all damage not covered by such insurance.
Owner
may have in effect at the commencement of this lease,
fire, theft, comprehensive and $100 deductible collision insurance.
If User furnishes Owner with evidence
of satisfactory insurance coverage within fifteen days
from the commencement of the lease, Owner's insurance
policy shall be terminated with no expense to User.
However, if evidence of satisfactory insurance coverage has not been furnished by User within fifteen days
of the commencement of this lease, User shall pay to
Owner the total premium under such insurance policy of
Owner and that policy may be kept in full force and
effect during the term of this lease.
In addition,
User specifically agrees to defend and hold harmless
Owner from any claim or liability whatsoever arising
from the use of the property herein leased during the
term of this lease,
including Owner's negligence.
Should User now or in the future become an "assigned
risk" or should a higher than average insurance premium otherwise be required, and if Owner has herein
agreed to maintain insurance coverage, User agrees to
pay any additional premium upon demand.
There was no reference to User or Owner in the blank provided
in the second sentence as to which party would maintain fire,
theft, and comprehensive insurance.
two ways:
would

(1)

apply

agreement.

This can be interpreted in

that the reference to User in the first sentence
to

the

second,

or

( 2)

that

the

parties

made

no

In either event, the obligation of insurance is not

imposed on Petty Motor Lease.
tion of Appellants,

the

Further, contrary to the asser-

use of the form by Petty Motor Lease
( 2 0)
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does not mean Petty Motor Lease assumed the risk by leaving the
line blank.

Both parties signed the Lease and had equal oppor-

tunity to insert a name on the line.
Appellants also claim Margaret Nickles did not guarantee the Agreement of Sale and Purchase.
Margaret Nickles

should not

be

liable

amount and interest thereon of $229,
all

other

respects,

Margaret

This would mean that
for

the

$621

purchase

or a total of $850.

Nickles

is

liable

in

the

In
same

amount as Centurian and Richard Nickles.
POINT V.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARD IN:; INTEREST IN
PARAGRAPH 3(a) OF ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AT THE RATE OF SIX
PERCENT (6%) PER ANNUM.
Paragraph 8 of the Lease provides in pertinent part as
follows:
8.
If User fails to make payments when due, or
refuses or fails to perform any other conditions of
this Lease,
User agrees to pay all costs and
expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by owner in enforcement of its rights under
this agreement and agrees to pay interest at the highest rate allowed by law upon all amounts not paid when
due.
(Emphasis added.)
The District Court, in its Conclusions of Law, awarded interest
at the rate of six percent per annum on the payments due under
the Lease.

The question raised is:

What is the interest rate

contemplated by the terms "highest rate allowed by law"?

This

language is to be distinguished from "the highest legal rate."
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code in
1969,

the State of Utah had a

usury

statute which

precluded

charging interest rates in excess of certain specified rates.
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code repealed the usury statutes.
( 21)
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Section

708-9-103,

Utah Code Ann.

In

the

place of the usury

statutes,

the Uniform Consumer Credit Code established maximum

interests

rates on certain

types of loans.

Section 708-3-201

(1) provides:
With respect to a consumer loan other than a
supervised loan . .
, a lender may contract for and
receive a loan finance· charge, calculated according to
the actuarial method, not exceeding 18 percent per
year on the unpaid balances of the principal.
Although the agreements between Petty Motor Lease and Centurian
are not claimed to be a consumer loan,

the foregoing provision

establishes what was anticipated by the parties to be the highest

rate

abolished

allowed
the

usury

which provided for
consumer

by

loans.

1

law.
statute

The

Uniform

and

Consumer

replaced

it

Credit

with

a

Code

statute

interest at 18 percent per annum on certain
Similarly,

Article

II

sumer Credit Code involves credit sales.

of

the

Uniform

Con-

Section 708-2-201 ( 2)

provides:
The credit service charge, calculated according
to the actuarial method, may not exceed the equivalent
of the greater of either of the following:

(a)

the total of (3 different interest rates
applied
on
unpaid
balances
at
various
levels]; or

(b)

18 percent per year on
of the amount financed.

the

unpaid

balances

lThe Uniform Consumer Credit Code eliminated the usury
statute and provided no maximum interest rate as to loans made
to an organization other than a natural person.
Section 7083-605 provides:
"With respect to a loan other than a consumer
loan or a consumer related loan, the parties may contract for
the payment by the debtor of any loan finance charge."
(22)
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Because the Uniform Consumer Credit Code abolished the
usury statutes and replaced them with the foregoing provisions,
the parties anticipated interest at the rate of 18 percent per
annum.

Petty Motor Lease submits that the applicable rate of

interest, based upon the intent of the parties, is the rate of
18 percent per annum.
POINT VI.
PETTY MOTOR LEASE SHOULD BE AWARDED
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS SINCE THE TRIAL.

ITS

Paragraph 8 of the Lease provides:
If User fails to make payments when due, or if
User fails to perform any other condition of this
Lease, . . . User agrees to pay all costs and expenses
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred by Owner
in enforcement of its rights in this agreement and
agrees to pay interest at the highest rate allowed by
law on all monies not paid when due.
At the trial of this matter, Petty Motor Lease claimed
an attorney's fee of $540 for time expended through trial
54).
appeal

Since the trial,
the

original

judgment after
Court,

this

Petty Motor Lease has been required to

judgment
Court

from June 2, 1978,

9, 1979.

(Tr.

of

the

remanded

Court,

the

case

sought
to

entry

of

the District

until judgment was entered on April

Thereafter, the motions to amend of Petty Motor Lease

and Centurian were denied on February 22,
pages 171-210.

See

1980.

Record,

Further, Petty Motor Lease has been involved in

this appeal.
Attorney's
Supreme Court.

fees on appeal are discretionary with the

Swain v.

Salt

Lake

Real

Estate

&

Investment

Co., 3 u.2d 121, 279 P.2d 709 (1955); see also Bates v. Bates,
560 P.2d 706

(1977).

Petty Motor Lease submits that it is en(23)
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titled to an award of attorney's fees to compensate it for the
employment of its attorney in these proceedings.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the District Court as to the
liability of Centur ian and the Nickles,
judgment so as not to deduct
Lease.

This

Court

should

Point V and attorney's fees,

and should modify the

the deposit made

also

award

to Petty Motor

interest

to be determined by

as

stated

the District

Court, as stated in Point VI.
DATED this 18th

in

day of July, 1980.

Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER

By
Wayne G. Petty
Attorney for Appellant
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111

( 24)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

day of July, 1980,

two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:

James R. Brown, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants in
Intervention-Respondents
370 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bryce K. Bryner, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant-Cripps
215 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501
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